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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Some had predicted that Dole would prompt the re-opening of
hundreds of pre-Dole actions involving multiple tortfeasors, 251 but this
has not occurred. The Lampila decision, holding as it does in favor of
full retroactivity, should alert the practitioner to the possibility that his
"dead" files may in fact be alive with Dole claims.2 52
It should be noted that, even if the Dole claim is struck, contribu-
tion may still be available under CPLR 1401 if the prior judgment
was obtained jointly against the party from whom contribution is
sought.
Waiver
While CPLR 1401 has been termed "near dead,"253 it maintains
some further vitality where the right to Dole apportionment has been
waived.25 In Caucci v. Fesko,255 the action was commenced one month
after Dole, and the trial judge's charges in accordance with pre-Dole
law went unchallenged at trial and on appeal. A subsequent claim for
relative contribution on cross-motion to a CPLR 1401 motion was
rejected by the Supreme Court, Westchester County, on the theory that
the failure to raise Dole rights before final judgment constituted a
waiver.
While Dole apportionment can generally be had in a separate
indemnity action, this right is not available where it could have been
asserted in the original action via crossclaim.25 6 In the present case,
the omission to assert Dole was not an inadvertence but was part of
the trial strategy.2 57 Where this is so, little reason exists to give the
party a second chance. However, this situation will rarely occur since
251 See, e.g., Welborn v. DeLeonardis, 168 N.Y.L.J. 3, July 6, 1972, at 2, col. 4, 5
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), wherein the court expressed fear that full retroactive application of
Dole would "create a chaotic situation .. "
252 The statute of limitations will generally pose no difficulty. It commences upon
payment of the judgment, Musco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't
1964), and runs for six years. CPLR 213(2) (McKinney 1972). See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3019,
supp. commentary at 239 (1973).
253 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 241 (1973).
254 For a discussion of the waiver of Dole rights see 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp.
commentary at 230 (1973); Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York
Law, 47 ST. JoHN's L Rxv. 185, 208 (1972).
255 76 Misc. 2d 614, 349 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973).
256 76 Misc. 2d at 616-17, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 889, quoting 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3019,
supp. commentary at 241 (1973). See Henriquez v. Mission Motor Lines, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d
782, 339 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
257 Professor David D. Siegel recommends that because of the newness and importance
of Dole rights, there should be a presumption against waiver and "[t]he dearest indications
of intent to waive, the strongest showing of prejudice to other litigants, or at least a dis-
tasteful combination of those things should be required to overturn the presumptions."
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 241 (1973).
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the trial court will generally raise the issue sua sponte if the parties
do not.256
Indemnity Contracts
One area in which Dole has been held inapplicable is where an
indemnity agreement exists between the parties. In Williams v. D. A. H.
Construction Corp.,259 the Appellate Division, Second Department,
reversed the trial court's direction of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
and third-party plaintiff, and remanded for a determination of whether
the terms of the indemnity contract had been satisfied, i.e., whether
the plaintiff's injury was caused by any act or omission by the third-
party defendant. The court stated that Dole does not apply in this
situation.260 It is notable, however, that while the indemnity agreement
controls the third-party plaintiff's claim here, Dole would have pro-
duced the same effect as the terms of the contract.
Court of Claims
The New York State Constitution establishes the Court of Claims
as the exclusive forum for claims against the state.261 As to claims
against all other defendants, however, the court has no competence
whatsoever. Because this truncated jurisdiction rules out third-party
practice,262 several actions may be necessary to finally resolve a contro-
versy to which the state is a party. This shortcoming of Court of Claims
practice has become all the more apparent since Dole.2 63 When the
268 The Second Department requires the trial court to sua sponte charge the jury
with respect to apportionment of fault even absent a crossclaim. Stein v. Whitehead, 40
App. Div. 2d 89, 337 N.Y.S.2d 821 (2d Dep't 1972). See also i1pson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d
599, 602, 334 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972) ("The court on its own
initiative is to instruct the jury to fix responsibility among the defendants and apportion
damages among those found to be liable.").
269 42 App. Div. 2d 877, 346 N.Y.S.2d 862 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
26o But see Schwab, supra note 232, at 160-61, where the author states:
If the intent of Dole, inter alia, is to broaden the basis of recovery and to induce
otherwise reluctant litigants to contribute towards a settlement, surely the con-
tractual indemnification case law of New York, as recent as it is, accomplishes a
contrary result.
261 The court has jurisdiction over "claims against the state or by the state against
the claimant or between conflicting claimants as the legislature may provide." N.Y. CONsr.
art. 4, § 9. See generally McNamara, The Court of Claims: Its Development and Present
Role in the Unified Court System, 40 ST. JOHN's L. RFv. 1 (1965); Jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims, Consolidation into the Supreme Court, in SEcoND AqNtuAL REPORT OF THE N.Y.
JUDICAL CONFERNCE 94 (1957).
262 See Horoch v. State, 286 App. Div. 308, 143 N.Y.S.2d 327 (3d Dep't 1955). Trial by
jury is not available in the Court of Claims. N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 12(3) (McKinney 1963). Im-
pleader by the state would, therefore, deprive a third-party defendant of a constitutionally
guaranteed right. N.Y. CoNsT. art 1, § 2.
263 See Bartlett v. State, 40 App. Div. 2d 267, 840 N.Y.S.2d 66 (4th Dep't 1973) (state
may not seek a Dole apportionment in the Court of Claims).
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